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 The fact that we predict eclipses does not, therefore, provide a valid reason 
for expecting that we can predict revolutions. (Popper, 2002, p. 340)
Introduction
Even though he is widely considered to be the founding father of the eco-
nomic discipline, Adam Smith would have a hard time finding a job at an 
economics department or getting his ideas published in any of the major 
economics journals, had he lived today. One of the central reasons for 
this is that neoclassical economics, which dominates the discipline today, 
and economics at the time of the great political economists such as Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo are differentiated by one single characteristic 
more than any other: their use of mathematics1 (Schabas, 1989). While 
today’s economics is best characterized as a thoroughly mathematical 
science, the writings of the classical economists were almost entirely dis-
cursive (Lawson, 2012; Hodgson, 2013). 
  This mathematical condition of modern economics has quite 
recently become the subject of heated debate and strong criticism in light 
of the economic crisis that has hit us in 2008 and still lingers on today. 
Many (i.e., Friedman, 1999, p. 137; Krugman, 2009a, 2009b) have argued 
that, caught up in more and more complex models, economics itself had 
become detached from its appropriate subject matter: real world economic 
problems. The economic science failed to make sense of our reality, and 
instead got lost in a different reality of their own making consisting of 
models and equations. 
  Such criticisms regarding the role of mathematics in economics 
and its inability to capture our economic reality are not, however, just 
something of the past seven years. Even though the role of mathemat-
ics has evolved to one of absolute dominance since the end of the 19th 
century, many have voiced criticisms towards this development. And the 
list of those critical of the mathematization of economics does not just 
name quirky heterodox economists at the margins of the discipline but 
also includes some of the most famous and important economists of the 
19th and 20th century.
  In this paper I will take a closer look at some of the concerns 
and warnings about the role of mathematics in economics put forward 
by Alfred Marshall, Friedrich Hayek and John Maynard Keynes. Specifi-
cally these economists have been selected because each of them has had 
a significant and constituting influence on the economic discipline, and 
because taken together they represent a substantial part of the diversity 
of the economic discipline at their time and today (i.e. Keynes’ argument 
for the occasional government intervention versus Hayek’s laissez-faire 
economy).2 This paper will focus on the concerns they voiced regarding 
mathematics in economics, which were born out of their shared convic-
tion of the complexity of economic reality. They argue that the world is too 
complex and varied for mathematics to be able to capture it, and that this 
thus poses limits to its use. They do not deny that mathematics can be use-
ful but one must know its place and restrictions. In this respect they stand 
in sharp contrast to economic thinkers such as William Stanley Jevons, 
Irving Fisher, Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, some 
of the founders of neoclassical mathematical economics, who believed that 
it was in fact possible to capture economic reality in mathematics and that 
it should therefore be adopted as the main engine of enquiry in economic 
science. 
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  After discussing concerns regarding the role of mathematics in eco-
nomics I will continue by addressing the question of why, seeing that both 
sides had respectable and important economists in their ranks, mathematics 
evolved to the dominant position it has today in spite of the concerns that 
were expressed. Why were these concerns put aside? As an answer to this 
question I argue that there existed and exists in economics a high demand 
for predictive power, which can be illustrated by Milton Friedman’s famous 
and influential statement that the performance of a theory is to be judged 
only by its ability to predict (Friedman, 1966, p. 4). What was demanded 
of an economic theory was that it provided the ability to predict events in 
the social world. It is my claim that this demand for predictive power is and 
was the result of the attempt to bring the world under the mastery of “man”: 
a process that Max Weber called “disenchantment” (Weber, 1958). I then 
argue that the reason the concerns voiced in the direction of mathemat-
ics were not able to stop its triumphal march to dominance is that these 
concerns were founded on ideas of real world complexity which were incom-
patible with this process of disenchantment and the demand for prediction 
that it entailed. 
Economics, mathematics and the complexity of economic reality
Let me begin by discussing an opposition between David Ricardo and 
Thomas Robert Malthus. Though Ricardo is one of those classical econo-
mists whose work is almost entirely discursive and who did not specifically 
advocate the use of mathematics, he did uphold the view that (simple) mod-
els could somehow be representative of a wide set of varied and complex 
phenomena (Ricardo, 1817). In this aspect he is the opposite of one of his 
fellow classical economists, Thomas Robert Malthus, who held the view that 
economic reality was far too complex and varied to be captured in models. 
Malthus therefore concluded that simple formal models were at most of 
highly limited use (Malthus, 1820). 
   I introduce this contradistinction here because it is to some extent 
illustrative of the arguments and concerns that I will address in what fol-
lows. I do not mean it to refer to a distinction between inductivism and 
deductivism, and I do not argue that there exists a one to one relation 
between an inductivist position and positions preaching caution regarding 
mathematics in economics nor between the deductivist position and those 
promoting math (Hodgson, 2013). Rather, the distinction between Malthus 
and Ricardo is to be illustrative of two opposing positions regarding the pos-
sibility of capturing economic reality in mathematics that will be addressed 
in what follows.
 So on the one hand there is the ‘Ricardian’ and so far victorious side 
of the story that believed that it is in fact possible to, putting it crudely, cap-
ture reality in a model. An important figure on the list of those subscribing 
to this line of thought is William Stanley Jevons, a famous 19th century econ-
omist who, by introducing his theory of marginal utility, was one of the first 
to provide an anchor for calculus and mechanical analogies in economics 
(Schabas, 1989; Hodgson, 2013). By arguing that it was possible to assign a 
number to the utility (pain or pleasure) that a person receives from a certain 
outcome, it became possible to introduce utility in mathematical economic 
models. And with the idea that utility was something that existed in reality, 
or was at least an analogy for something that existed in reality, came the idea 
that it was possible to capture economic reality in mathematics and mechan-
ical analogies and the conviction that studying these would provide us with 
information about real world economic phenomena (Schabas, 1989). 
  Jevons’ framework and ideas about mathematics being the primary 
engine of enquiry for economics were developed further in the late 19th and 
early 20th century by several important economists (such as Irving Fisher). 
However, it was not until the late 1950’s that these ideas about the formali-
zation of economics found their culmination in the works of economists 
like Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu and Paul Samuelson, who established 
the foundations for post-war mathematical economic theory (Blaug, 2002, 
2003). That this line of economists believed that mathematics was truly able 
to capture economic reality is nicely illustrated by the following statement 
made by Paul Samuelson in one of his early papers at Harvard: 
Mathematical methods properly employed, far from making economic 
theory more abstract, actually serve as a powerful liberating device 
enabling the entertainment and analysis of ever more realistic and 
complicated hypothesis. (Samuelson, 1939)
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So for the young Samuelson, as for many of his colleagues at the time, it 
was clear enough: by using mathematics we are able to make our hypoth-
eses match more and more closely to the way things actually are. It was 
believed (and is still believed by many today) that the models that math-
ematical economics produces would be able to capture something useful 
about economic reality when applied to it (Lawson, 1997; Hodgson, 
2013). And so it was thought of not only as possible, but also as better to 
use mathematics to express oneself in economics. For most economists, to 
state a theory in terms of a formal model is an unambiguous improvement 
(Chick, 2001).   
 But this idea of mathematics being able to capture reality and 
thus being the ultimate engine to enquire about, it is not something that 
was without criticism. There were quite some economists who, like Mal-
thus, emphasized that economic reality was too complex to be captured in 
mathematics, and that models are thus at best of highly limited use. Let us 
first turn to Alfred Marshall in that respect. 
 Marshall saw the limits to highly general ‘pure theory’ of the type 
found in the works of Ricardo and Jevons and though they were produced 
quite some time after his death, he would surely have found the same lim-
its in the type of pure theory found in the works of economists like Arrow, 
Debreu and Samuelson (Marchionatti, 2004; Hodgson, 2013). In his let-
ter to Arthur Bowley, the LSE’s first professor of statistics, he wrote:
I had a growing feeling in the later years of my work at the subject that a 
good mathematical theorem dealing with economic hypotheses was very 
unlikely to be good economics. (Pigou, 1925, p. 427)
Though some have also emphasized Marshall’s role in the rise of math-
ematical economics (e.g. Schabas, 1989) it seems indubitable that he 
himself did not believe in a purely mathematical economic science and 
continuously emphasized the danger of formalization causing economic 
theory to stray away from real-life relevance (Marchionatti, 2004). 
  This does not mean that Marshall opposed the use of mathe-
matics altogether. He simply held that it should not be the economists’ 
principal engine of enquiry. One can, and according to Marshall should, 
use mathematics as a shorthand language for thinking (Schabas, 1989). 
But afterwards, he argued, one should always translate back to real world 
examples and “burn the mathematics” (Pigou, 1925, p. 427). 
  Now why is it that mathematics should not, according to Marshall, 
be our primary engine of enquiry? Why should we burn the mathemat-
ics and use it only as a shorthand language for thought? The reason for 
this is precisely that he believed mathematics was unable to capture eco-
nomic reality (Marchionatti, 2004). Marshall thought that the economic 
world was far too complex to be represented in mathematics and that if 
we were to use mathematics as our primary engine of inquiry, we would 
not be enquiring about our actual world, but rather about some abstract 
and incomplete version of it (Marchionatti, 2004). According to Marshall, 
excessive reliance on mathematics would, in the words of Arthur Pigou:
(…) lead us astray in the pursuit of intellectual toys, imaginary problems 
not conforming to the conditions of real life, and further, might distort 
our sense of proportion by causing us to neglect factors that could not 
easily be worked up in the mathematical machine. (Pigou, 1925, p. 
84)
These factors that could not be easily worked up in mathematical machines 
are precisely those factors that characterize the complexity of economic 
reality. And it is economic reality rather than any abstract mathematical 
version of it that should, Marshall believed, be the primary subject of eco-
nomics (Marchionatti, 2004). 
  Marshall’s recognition of the complex character of real world eco-
nomic systems is signaled by his invocation of biology rather than physics 
(Hodgson, 1993; Hodgson, 2013, p. 8). In his Principles of Economics 
Marshall wrote:
Economics, like biology, deals with a matter of which the inner nature 
and constitution, as well as the outer form, are constantly changing. 
(Marshall, 1961, p. 772)
In an article in The Economic Journal in 1898 Marshall expressed a similar 
view. There, he wrote that:
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‘Progress’ or ‘evolution,’ industrial and social, is not mere increase and 
decrease. It is organic growth, chastened and confined and occasionally 
reversed by decay of innumerable factors, each of which influences and 
is influenced by those around it; and every such mutual influence varies 
with the stages which the respective factors have already reached in their 
growth. (Marshall, 1898, pp. 42-43)
So instead of emphasizing the parallelism with physics like for exam-
ple Fisher did, Marshall emphasized much more the similarities that 
economics shared with biology. And the resulting recognition of the 
complexity of the world led Marshall to be cautious of mathematics in 
economics. That is, it led Marshall to be cautious of using mathematics 
as a primary engine of inquiry. For him, the complexities of economic 
reality were not arguments against the use of mathematics in econom-
ics in general, and he did recognize that mathematics could be of great 
importance (Schabas, 1989). But these complexities did, according to 
Marshall, constitute limits to the employment of mathematics in eco-
nomics (Marchionatti, 2004). 
  A similar emphasis on the complexity of economic reality and 
appreciation of economics’ similarities with biology rather than physics 
we find in the works of Friedrich Hayek. Hayek continuously emphasized 
the difference between the social sciences and physics and criticized what 
he called scientism: the desire of economics to be like physics. He argued 
that mathematical economics would never be able to achieve the kind of 
completeness that physics could achieve:
While in the physical sciences it is generally assumed, probably with 
good reason, that any important factor which determines the observed 
events will itself be directly observable and measurable, in the study of 
such complex phenomena as the market, which depend on the actions 
of many individuals, all the circumstances which will determine the 
outcome of a process, for reasons which I shall explain later, will hardly 
ever be fully known or measurable. (Hayek, 1989, p. 2)
The reason for that state of affairs, Hayek argues, is the fact that:
(…) the social sciences, like much of biology but unlike most fields of 
the physical sciences, have to deal with structures of essential complexity. 
(Hayek, 1989, p. 4)
Like Marshall, this conviction of the complexity of economic reality led 
Hayek to have a resistance towards formal modeling. He did not oppose 
formal modeling in general, but he emphasized that there are limits to its 
use. He stated that as we advance towards more and more complex situa-
tions:
(…) we find more and more frequently that we can in fact ascertain 
only some but not all the particular circumstances which determine the 
outcome of a given process. (Hayek, 1989, p. 7)
The desire to capture reality in mathematical models, Hayek argued, 
causes economics to neglect factors that cannot be easily incorporated in 
the mathematical machine. In Hayek’s words:
In the social sciences often that is treated as important which happens to 
be accessible to measurement. (Hayek, 1989, p. 2)
Much is thus left out when a model is created, and the more complex the 
situation that is modeled, the less the model is like that actual situation. 
Already in 1937 this was a criticism that Hayek voiced against much of the 
economic work that was produced at that time:
More recent work has been freer from this fault [of mixing up the a priori 
and the empirical] – but only at the price of leaving more and more 
obscure what sort of relevance their arguments had to the phenomena of 
the real world. (Hayek, 1937, p. 54)
So we see an emphasis on the fact that important factors are left out in any 
model of a complex economic reality and the fact that this poses limits to 
the use of mathematics in economics. This emphasis is something that we 
also find in some of the works of John Maynard Keynes, whose views on 
the matter were deeply rooted in Marshall’s (Marchionatti, 2009). Keynes’ 
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work as an economist was essentially an attempt to cope with the complex-
ity of the economic world and the organic interdependence of variables, 
founded on a conception of economics as a science of social complexity 
(Marchionatti, 2009).  In his 1939 article On Professor Tinbergen’s Method 
he, like Hayek and Marshall, makes clear that if a model is to be represent-
ative of economic reality not only significant but rather all causes must be 
accounted for in the model and that furthermore all these factors must be 
measurable so as to be able to account for them in a precise mathematical 
way. It is highly unlikely that all the factors that affect a certain outcome 
are in fact measurable and even more unlikely that we know all factors that 
are involved (Marchionatti, 2004, 2009). Keynes states that: 
If we were dealing with (…) independent atomic factors and between 
them completely comprehensive, acting with fluctuating relative 
strength on material constant and homogeneous through time, we might 
be able to use the method of multiple correlation with some confidence 
for disentangling the laws of their action. (Keynes, 1973,p. 286)
But we are not. Due to the nature of economic material, a complete and exact 
generalization is not possible, and any model we create will thus be incomplete 
(Marchionatti, 2004). Additionally this means that neither a mathematical 
theory nor a prediction can be confirmed by data from economic reality:
If the method cannot prove or disprove a qualitative theory and if it 
cannot give a quantitative guide to the future, is it worthwhile? (Keynes, 
1939, p. 566)
With an almost audible ‘sigh’ Keynes then concludes that he has: 
(…) a feeling that Prof. Tinbergen may agree with him, but that his 
reaction will be to engage another ten computers and drown his sorrow 
in arithmetic. (Keynes, 1939, p. 568).
Because of the complexity of economic reality, and because of the 
uncertainty that results from such complexity, the use of mathemati-
cal models is highly limited according to Keynes. Like Marshall and 
Hayek, Keynes believed that due to this complexity, mathematical 
models always rested on (implicit) a priori assumptions (such as ceteris 
paribus). The more of these assumptions are involved, the more incom-
plete and less like reality a model becomes. This was one of the main 
problems that Keynes noticed in the output of mathematical econom-
ics of his time:
Too large a proportion of recent ‘mathematical’ economics are mere 
concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which 
allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies 
of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols. 
(Keynes 1936, p. 298)
Mathematics was, according to Keynes, at best only a small part of the 
economic discipline. For him, capturing, understanding and interpreting 
complex economic reality also involved: 
(…) the amalgam of logic and intuition and the wide knowledge of facts, 
most of which are not precise. (Keynes, 1972, p. 158)
What I have tried to make clear in the above is that the rise of math-
ematics in economics was not without criticism. Furthermore I have 
attempted to show that behind several of these criticisms voiced by 
important and influential economists lies the idea that economic real-
ity cannot be captured in mathematical models or formulas, due to its 
complexity and openness. 
  Over time many more of such concerns have been voiced 
(Blaug, 2002). Amongst those voicing these concerns were, again, very 
influential economists such as Nobel laureates Milton Friedman and 
Paul Krugman who expressed their unhappiness with the fact that eco-
nomics was becoming more and more a branch of mathematics than a 
social science dealing with real world economic problems. In spite of 
all these concerns however, economics has developed to become a thor-
oughly mathematical science (Lawson, 1997, 2012; Chick, 1998, 2001; 
Blaug, 2002; Marchionatti, 2004; Hodgson, 2013). Why is it that these 
concerns have not made their way into mainstream economics? Why is 
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it that, in the words of Ronald Coase, “mathematics rides triumphant 
in economics?” (Coase, 1972, p. 415). I now turn towards a possible 
answer. 
Complexity marginalized: the desire for prediction
The desire of economics to be like physics not only directed its approach 
to modeling but also elevated prediction as the supreme goal of the eco-
nomic discipline. This predilection for prediction still exists today, as is 
evidenced by the continuous subscription of the economic science to Mil-
ton Friedman’s famous argument that the test of a theory is its capacity for 
prediction (Hodgson, 2013, p. 14). It is the desire for the ability to predict 
that, I would argue, is the crucial force behind the marginalization of the 
calls for caution made by economists such as Marshall, Hayek and Keynes. 
  But first I want to take a closer look at where this desire for predic-
tive power might come from. Why was it the ultimate goal in physics and 
what can this tell us about the goal of prediction in economics? Why did 
economics take over physics’ goal, rather than only its methods? These are 
of course very big questions, and no doubt many different factors are in 
play. In this section, I want to expand on one factor in particular, which 
I claim to be of great importance. This factor is a development that Max 
Weber (1922, p. 117) has termed ‘disenchantment’ and that Charles Tay-
lor (2007) has more broadly called ‘secularization’. 
 In his 1922 Science as a Vocation lecture, Max Weber noted some-
thing similar to what Hayek and Keynes expressed about economics at 
their time:
Nowadays in circles of youth there is a widespread notion that science has 
become a problem in calculation, fabricated in laboratories or statistical 
filing systems just as ‘in a factory,’ a calculation involving only the cool 
intellect and not one’s ‘heart and soul. (Weber, 1958, p. 113) 
This idea that anything can be calculated is what Weber termed ‘rationali-
zation’ and it is a crucial element of the process of ‘disenchantment’. It is 
the idea that:
(…) principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come 
into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by 
calculation. (Weber, 1922, p. 117)
The phrasing “master all things” is crucial here. ‘Disenchantment’, or 
what Taylor calls ‘secularization’ is the process of men taking over from 
God the control of the world. It is the process of the marginaliza-
tion of God in the natural world in the 19th and early 20th century 
(Taylor, 2007, pp. 94-95). Slowly, things that were normally assumed 
to be determined by God or other spirits came under men’s control. 
Industrialization and the technological innovations that came with this 
process provided society with the idea that we can control nature and 
shape our own world.  Furthermore it provided us with the tools to 
do so. Secularization moved the privilege to alter and direct the world 
from the domain of God to the domain of human beings (Taylor, 
2007, pp. 121-125). 
  The crucial tool in bringing the world under the control of men 
was natural science (Taylor, 2007). For natural science provided not only 
the ability to explain what had happened but also to predict what would 
happen. And this ability to predict is the crucial element in men’s ability 
to control and direct the world they inhabit (Taylor, 2007). We cannot 
control what ‘way we will go’, or what will happen, if we cannot predict 
the consequences of our actions. Without prediction, the world is out of 
our control. 
  And so the development of the natural sciences and its increased 
ability to predict natural events provided men with an increasing amount 
of control over the natural world and enabled them more and more to 
direct the natural world in the direction that they wanted it to go. 
  But the natural world is not the only world that mankind inhab-
its. For next to that natural world we also live in a world of social processes. 
I argue that the desire for control extends to that social world just as it did 
to the natural world and thus claim that the desire for predictive power in 
economics is the result of this broader development of mankind trying to 
gain control over the world they inhabit; the result of the desire to remove 
all mystical forces from that world.
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  In order to gain control over economic reality, we need to be able 
to predict. It is prediction that is required for economic policy, rather than 
explanation. If we cannot predict, it makes no sense to try and change the 
social world, for we do not know what the consequences of our actions 
will be. And it is in that respect also not very surprising that we turned 
to physics. For physics had proven itself to be extremely capable in pre-
dicting and at the time that economists turned to physics, men had already 
achieved a large degree of control over the natural world. So I would argue 
that physics-envy, or ‘scientism’ in Hayek’s words, not only results from an 
admiration for its rigor and form, but also very much from an admiration 
for its ability to bring the world we live in under our control. 
  My claim is thus that the desire for predictive power in economics 
is an expression of man’s attempt to remove all mysterious and mystical 
forces, such as invisible hands, from the social world, and to master all 
things by calculation. But it is precisely those mystical forces, those things 
beyond calculation that Marshall, Hayek and Keynes introduce, though in 
a different form, with their emphasis on the complexity of economic real-
ity. Like Daniel Stein says:
Complexity is almost a theological concept; many people talk about it, 
but nobody knows what ‘it’ really is. (Stein, 1989, p. xiii)
A complex reality is coherent in some recognizable way but it has a struc-
ture admitting surprise and novelty, which cannot be known beforehand. 
The problems of such real world complexity are thus, according to Hayek:
(…) not, as one might at first suspect, difficulties about formulating 
theories for the explanation of the observed events - although they cause 
also special difficulties about testing proposed explanations and therefore 
about eliminating bad theories. They are due to the chief problem, which 
arises when we apply our theories to any particular situation in the real 
world. A theory of essentially complex phenomena must (unlike physics) 
refer to a large number of particular facts; and to derive a prediction from 
it, or to test it, we have to ascertain all these particular facts. (Hayek, 
1989, p. 6).
And to ascertain all these particular facts is, for complex situations, vir-
tually impossible (Kilpatrick, 2001). So precisely because the economic 
world is too complex to be captured by mathematics and to be predictable, 
it is also too complex to be fully brought under men’s control. 
  There is thus a tension between real world complexity and pre-
diction in the social sciences. In a complex world the possibilities for 
prediction are at best limited (Hodgson, 2013). This, I argue, is one of the 
main reasons for the marginalization of the pleas for caution by Marshall, 
Hayek and Keynes. Their emphasis on complexity was something that did 
not correspond to the desire to predict and control; it did not fit with the 
process of the disenchantment of the social world. In a complex world, 
where men has no control over what will happen, what basis is there for 
economic policy? It has been argued that this is also the idea behind Hayek’s 
promotion of the adoption of laissez-faire economics (Kilpatrick, 2001). 
In any case it seems that subscribing to the idea of a complex economic 
reality highly limits the ability to say anything more about the future than 
that it is unpredictable. The line of thought that holds that mathematics 
is able to capture economic reality, and thus is able to determine the out-
comes of economic events by calculation, has a much better fit with this 
general desire to take control of the world we live in. If we can calculate 
the outcomes of different actions and events in economic reality, we have 
a basis for policy-making, a basis for manipulating the world to make it 
fit the way we think it should be. This is something we had achieved in 
the natural world, and we desired the same thing for the social world we 
inhabit. Complexity, on the other hand, requires us to admit and, more 
importantly, to accept, that there are still ‘mystical and mysterious’ forces 
left in that social world: forces which are unpredictable and whose ration-
alization lies beyond our cognitive capacities. 
  That the victory of mathematical economics was the result of a 
predilection for prediction and control rather than one for mathematical 
rigor and beauty is something that is supported further by the fact that 
there have also been several alternative mathematical approaches which 
were able to deal with complexity, but that have been neglected by main-
stream economic theory (Hodgson, 2013, p. 14). These alternatives (such 
as chaos theory or complexity theory) are able to capture complex sys-
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tems in mathematics, but do so with a significant loss of predictive power. 
And so the marginalization of these approaches suggests that mainstream 
economics is not focused on mathematical models in general, but rather 
more specifically on mathematical models that yield predictions (Hodg-
son, 2013, pp. 14-15). A possible explanation for this desire for predictive 
power is thus, as I have argued above, the disenchantment of the social 
world.
  
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the development of economics towards the 
mathematical science that it is today has not been without critique. I have 
discussed concerns voiced by Alfred Marshall, Friedrich Hayek and John 
Maynard Keynes, which stress the importance of recognizing the fact that 
economic reality is highly complex and that this constitutes some serious 
limits to the use of mathematics in economics and to the predictability of 
economic reality in general. 
  Even though influential and important economists voiced these 
concerns, they have had virtually no impact on the development of the 
economic discipline as it exists today. The reason for this, I have argued, 
is that there is a tension between prediction and complexity. In a com-
plex system the possibilities for prediction are highly limited at best. I 
have argued that there existed however a demand for predictive power that 
might be a result of the process that Weber has called ‘disenchantment’ 
involving men’s attempt to gain control over the natural world they live 
in. I suggest that this desire to gain control exists for the social world just 
as it does for the natural world. In order to control, we need to be able 
to predict, and therefore the desire of men to have control over the world 
has been an important source of the demand for prediction. The con-
flict between this demand for prediction a complexity is the main reason 
behind the fact that the concerns voiced by economists such as Marshall, 
Hayek and Keynes, have remained in the margins and have not been able 
to affect mainstream economics. What I have tried to show in this paper 
is how it was possible that economics became a mathematical science in 
spite of the concerns that were raised against these developments by influ-
ential economists. This is so because the basis from which they criticized 
mathematics, real world complexity, was in conflict with the fundamental 
process of disenchantment.
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Notes
1. In this paper, mathematics is supposed to refer to the kind of formal tools used by the 
majority of the economic profession, which includes calculus and optimization, set theory, 
linear algebra and game theory.
2. Hayek believed that any restrictions on freedom to conduct trade, on price levels or on 
quantities sold would have serious negative consequences for welfare. The most efficient 
tool to improve the general level of wealth, he claimed, is competition of private actors in 
a free market. Keynes on the other hand believed that such a system often leads to mac-
roeconomic outcomes that are inefficient. He thus argued for the occasional active policy 
intervention by the public sector, especially by monetary and fiscal instruments.
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